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Excuses and Dispositions in Criminal Law 
Claire Finkelsteint 
I. INTRODUCTION 
What do criminal laws prohibit? A series of immoral 
or harmful acts? Or does the law also seek to prohibit 
performing those acts for certain reasons, acting on certain 
motives, or acting on the basis of certain character traits? 
In short, does the law look only at the quality of the act the 
defendant performs? Or does it look more broadly at 
whether the person who performed the prohibited act was 
righteous or ignoble, well-meaning or malign? 
The traditional view says that the criminal law focuses 
uniquely on acts. According to that view, character and 
motive are irrelevant to criminal liability.1 They are not 
relevant to the actus reus, since they merely serve to 
identify the prohibited conduct. 2 And they are not relevant 
t Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania. My thanks 
to Kim Ferzan, Leo Katz, and Peter Westen for comments on various drafts and 
discussions on the topic of this article. 
1. See H.L.A Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (1968); R.A. Duff, Virtue, 
Vice and Criminal Liability: Do We Want An Aristotelian Criminal Law?, 6 Buff. 
Crim. L. Rev. 147 (2002); Benjamin Sendor, The Relevance of Conduct and 
Character to Guilt and Punishment, 10 Notre Dame J.L. Ethica &: Pub. Pol'y 99 
(1996); R.A. Duff, Choice, Character and Criminal Liability, 12 Law &: Phil. 345 
(1993); Michael S. MooTe, Choice, Character, and Excuse, 7 Soc. Phil. &: Pol'y 29 
(1990). 
2. Motive is occasionally relevant for establishing the special mental state 
required for crimes of specific intent, as it is in bias crimes or crimes that 
separately criminalize killing for hire or for sexual pleasure. But even the 
ordinary specific intent crimes, such as burglary, which requires the "intent to 
commit a crime," Model Penal Code§ 221.1 (1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962), or 
forgery, which requires a "purpose to defraud or injure," id. § 224.1(1), do not 
actually criminalize motive, though they might appear to do so. The mens rea in 
these cases does not so much go to the question of why the defendant entered a 
building or altered a writing, as it goes to the furtl�r intention with which he did 
it. The motive for such crimes, such as money, revenge, or hatred, are nowhere 
part of the offense definition. 
German law, by contrast, explicitly treats crimes done from different 
motives as different crimes. For example, the StGB defines murder in terms of its 
motive, namely as killing for sheer pleasure, to satisfY a sexual impulse, or on 
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to the mens rea, since the mental state requirement serves 
only to ensure that the defendant is responsible for what he 
did or for the state of affairs he brought about. 3 The 
traditionalist will of course allow that there are instances 
in which character or motive can affect a defendant's 
ultimate fate. A motive like self-defense or necessity will 
entitle a defendant to a justification defense. And a person 
who has manifested a good character throughout his life 
will usually receive a shorter sentence than a defendant 
who has manifested a bad one. But these examples are not 
inconsistent with the traditional view, which maintains 
that notions like character and motive are irrelevant for 
prima facie judgments of criminal responsibility. 
In recent years, a number of writers have challenged 
the received wisdom. 4 Inspired at least in part by a revival 
of virtue ethics in the philosophical literature, 5 the 
"character theorists" begin with the Aristotelian thesis that 
human beings create their own character traits by 
repeatedly performing acts of the sort that display that 
trait. Thus a person acquires the trait of bravery by 
performing frequent brave acts, and a person acquires the 
trait of liberality by spending money freely. According to 
the character theorists, punishing agents for bad acts they 
perform is a way of punishing them for the bad characters 
account of greed or other "base motives." But ordinary intentional killing, not 
done from one of theRe motive.��, is not murder, §§ 211 & 212 StGB, 
3. A person does not lack the mens rea for murder, for example, because he 
ki!!ed for the pu� of putting li terminaJ!y iJ! patient OUt of hill misery, OJ' even 
because he killed in self-defense. That is, justifications like self-defense and 
necessity do not "negative" the mens rea for the offense. A person who kills in 
self-defense kills intentionally, and so satisfies the mens rea for murder. This is 
in contrast to excuses like mistake, which negative the mens rea for the crime 
they exonerate. 
4. See Victor Tadros, The Characters of Excuse, 21 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 495 
{2001); Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1423 (1995); 
Dan M. Kahan & Martha Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal 
Law, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 269 (1996); John Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, 1 Buff. 
Crim. L. Rev. 575 (1998); Peter Arenella, Character, Choice and Moral Agency, 7 
Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 59 (1990). 
5. See Philippa Foot, Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives, 81 
Phil. Rev. 305 (1972). 
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that produced those acts, and of encouraging the 
development of good character traits in the future. 
The debate between the traditionalists-the so-called 
"choice theorists"-and the character theorists has 
particularly come to the fore in writings about the criminal 
defenses. Because choice theorists see human beings as 
responsible for the freely chosen conduct in which they 
engage, choice theorists are inclined to understand 
criminal defenses as falling into one of two categories: 
Action which is chosen but justified by considerations of 
social welfare, and action which is excused because not 
fully chosen.6 But character theory has allowed for an 
interesting and different position on the defenses. If 
criminal liability is based on the bad character or motive of 
the person who intentionally violates a prohibitory norm, a 
defendant might at least be entitled to an excuse where his 
bad act does not in fact support an inference from the 
quality of the act to the quality of the underlying character 
trait.7 Because we cannot draw the conclusions about the 
defendant's character we supposedly do in cases of 
unexcused wrongdoing, the rationale for inflicting 
punishment does not obtain.8 
A variation on this general theme suggests that the 
criminal law is primarily concerned with punishing 
defendants who manifest a defect of motivation, and that 
we should excuse those who violate the law in cases where 
no defect of motivation exists. 9 Like the claim about 
6. An altem!ltive approach t{! justifi!:ation in the choite theory literature 2ees 
justified acts as issuing from moral rights people have. A:s I explain below, 
however, the rights version of justification does not fundamentally change the 
structure of the choice theory, and in particular, does not eliminate its drawbacks. 
See infra text accompanying notes 34. 
7. George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law§ 10.3.1 (1978); Huigens, supra 
note4. 
8. See Michael Moore, Placing Blame (1997); Stephen Garvey, "As the Gentle 
Rain From Heaven": Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 989, 1024 
(1996) (referring to what he calls the "character-will theory"); Michael Corrado, 
Notes on the Structure of A Theory of Excuses, 82 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 465 
(1992). 
9. See Richard B. Brandt, A Motivational Theory of Excuses in the Criminal 
Law, in Nomos XXVII: Criminal Justice 165 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. 
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character, the suggestion about motive is that we cannot 
draw any negative conclusions about the motives of a 
person whose reason for violating the law is that he fears 
for his life or for the life of a loved one. 
The purpose of this article is not to revisit the debate 
between the choice and the. character theorists. Much has 
already been written on that debate, and I have little of 
substance to add to it. Instead, my purpose is to return to 
a project I began in previous writings, namely to 
understand the structure of a certain class of defenses I call 
"rational excuses. "10 Defenses in this category straddle the 
line between traditional excuses and justifications. They 
are cases, I claim, where the agent acts on the basis of 
deliberation, and so controis her behavior. But I call them 
"excuses," rather than justifications, because they are also 
cases where the agent acts for personal reasons, rather 
than for the impersonal considerations of social welfare. 
My suggestion will be that neither the choice theory nor the 
character theory is particularly well-suited to account for 
the rational excuses. In particular, I shall argue that while 
choice theorists are more nearly correct about the general 
structure of criminal responsibility, they do not have a 
plausible theory of exculpation. And while character 
theorists are right to suggest that states of character and 
dispositions should be taken into account in criminal 
liability, the theory does not do so in the right way. The 
rational excuses thus reveal the need for a different theory 
of exculpation than either the choice or the character 
theory provides. 
In what follows, I shall suggest that the rational 
excuses exonerate because they are cases in which the 
agent acts on the basis of what I shall call an "adaptive 
disposition," namely a disposition that enhances the 
welfare of the agent who cultivates it and makes possible 
Chapman eds., 1985), rpt. in Richard B. Brandt, Morality, Utilitarianism, and 
Rights (1992). 
10. See Claire Finkelstein, Self-Defense as a Rational Excuse, 57 U. Pitt. L. 
Rev. 621 (1996); Claire Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account of the 
Defense in Law, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 252 (1995). 
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collective welfare improvements. The law is interested in 
promoting and rewarding such dispositions, because there 
will be mutual gains from their adoption if members of 
society generally possess them. It will thus tuni out to be 
possible to vindicate the legal rules establishing the class of 
defenses I am calling rational excuses in contractarian 
terms, since a rational agent would agree to a legal rule 
that leaves him better off than he would be in its absence. 
My argument will proceed as follows. In the next Part, 
I review the basic elements of the choice and character 
theories, along with the account of the defenses implied by 
each. In Part III, I lay out the structure of the rational 
excuses, and I explain why the choice theory is ill-equipped 
to account for defenses in this category. In Part IV, I do the 
same for the character theory. I argue that that theory is 
both problematic in its own right and unable to account for 
the rational excuses. In Part V, I present my alternative 
account of the rational excuses. I explain why the rational 
excuses require a disposition-based account. In Part VI I 
conclude by explaining why the fact that the relevant 
dispositions are adaptive allows us to justify the rules 
governing the rational excuses in contractarian terms. 
II. CHOICE AND CHARACTER 
The choice theory of criminal responsibility predicates 
responsibility on the individual choice the defendant makes 
to violate a prohibitory norm. The choice theory thus 
naturally focuses on '-u�tions; rather than on states of 
character, and on whether those actions conform to an 
objective standard of conduct. As Peter Arenella explains 
the theory, "When ... an actor makes a rational choice to 
engage in conduct that breaches the governing norm, he 
deserves moral blame because he could have chosen to 
comply with it. "11 On other versions of the account, what is 
relevant is the moral worth of the choice the agent makes. 
As R.A. Duff writes, "We might dislike or regret other 
11. Arenella, supra note 4, at 59. 
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aspects of a person's character, but only his will is a proper 
object of moral criticism. "12 It is consistent with this view 
to treat each criminal act as a separate object of evaluation. 
The choice theory has no interest in a pattern of choices an 
individual might have made in the past, nor in an overall 
trait that might lead her to make such choices in the 
future. For this reason, the choice theory has no use for 
observations about the relation between the prohibited 
action and the defendant's character. 
The authoritative statement of the choice theory is 
H.L.A. Hart's in Punishment and Responsibility. On the 
conception of responsibility for which Hart argues, the 
crucial questions, both for moral and legal responsibility, 
are about "the character or extent of a man's control over 
his own conduct, or . . . the causal or other connexion 
between his action and harmful occurrences, or . . . his 
relationship with the person who actually did the harm. "13 
The basic element of control must also be combined with a 
set of background capacities to obey the law, as well as 
with external circumstances that allow the agent to 
exercise those capacities: "What is crucial is that those 
whom we punish should have had, when they acted, the 
normal capacities, physical and mental, for doing what the 
law requires and abstaining from what it forbids, and a fair 
opportunity to exercise those capacities."14 When the 
background capacities are satisfied, and the external 
circumstances provide individuals with an opportunity to 
obey the law, the choice to perform an (unjustified) act that 
violates the law is both a necessary and a sufficient 
condition for criminal liability. 
The choice theory is usually combined with a welfare­
based standard for evaluating the content of an agent's 
choices. Thus an agent will be blamed for his decision to 
violate the criminal law, unless he can justify his choice by 
its positive effects on social welfare. Such justifications 
apply to instances in which, although the defendant's act 
12. Duff, Choice, Character and Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 346. 
13. Hart, supra note 1, at 225. 
14. Id. at 152. 
2002] EXCUSES AND DISPOSITIONS 323 
falls within the ambit of the prohibitory norm the law 
defines, the law is otherwise committed to promoting the 
defendant's conduct. A person who must burn a field in 
order to create a firebreak to save a town from destruction 
by forest fire would have a defense to the crime of 
intentionally destroying the property of another, because 
the overwhelming social importance of saving the town 
justifies the legal infraction. For those criminal acts that 
do not merit punishment, but where reasons of social 
utility are unavailing, the choice theory can only explain 
the defendant's exoneration if it is able to deny that the 
agent actually chose to violate the prohibitory norm. 
Where the agent was mistaken, acted accidentally, or 
moved his body involuntarily, we cannot regard him as 
having chosen to violate the law, and thus we do not hold 
him responsible for his conduct. Lack of capacity in the 
criminal law thus functions as an excusing condition much 
in the way that a denial of capacity will serve to invalidate 
a contract: Just as a person cannot be understood to have 
truly agreed to the terms of a contract if he was insane, 
infantile, intoxicated, mistaken, coerced, etc., so these same 
conditions will defeat the presumption that an agent who 
violated a criminal prohibition was responsible for violating 
the law. In this way, the choice theory gives rise to what is 
sometimes called the "capacity'' theory of the excuses, 
meaning that it accounts for the excuses in terms of a 
diminished capacity on the agent's part to conform her 
behavior to the law.16 
The association between Hart's choice theory of 
responsibility and the capacity theory of the excuses has 
become a standard part of commentary and black letter 
law. Paul Robinson, in his treatise on the defenses, 
explains that all excuses are characterized by the fact that 
they have a "disability requirement."18 He writes: "The 
disability requirement is the actor's abnormal condition at 
the time of the offense . . . . It may be a long-term or even 
15. See Tadros, supra note 4, at 495. 
16. 2 Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses § 161 (1984). 
324 BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:317 
permanent condition, such as subnormality, or it may be a 
temporary state, such as intoxication, somnambulism, 
automatism, or hypnotism. Its cause may be internal, as in 
insanity, or external, as in duress."17 A defendant will 
normally have a defense, Robinson suggests, when his 
disability causes him to act in a way that is not the product 
of his voluntary effort or determination, to mistake the 
physical nature or consequences of his conduct, to mistake 
the wrongfulness or criminality of his behavior, or to be 
unable to control his conduct. If, on the other hand, the 
defendant chose to violate a criminal prohibition, while he 
was in control of his conduct and without legal justification, 
he is responsible for the violation and will be called to 
account for it. 
Those who take a character-based approach to 
criminal liability, by contrast, regard the focus on the 
defendant's choice as an overly narrow basis on which to 
assess the merits of his conduct. Instead, they argue, 
criminal acts are punishable only insofar as they stem from 
established features of an agent's character. By 
"character," these theorists have in mind roughly the 
Aristotelian concept of fixed or stable aspects of an agent's 
psychological make-up that pertain to virtues and vices. 
Unlike their counterparts in moral theory, however, the 
character theorists in criminal law need not hold a virtue 
theory of moral responsibility. The relevance of character 
to criminal liability has been claimed both by those who 
hold a retributivist theory of punishment, and by those who 
espouse the corresponding utilitarian view .18 The 
suggestion of the former (what we might call "character 
retributivists") is that an actor's desert for punishment is 
17. Id.at222. 
18. As Michael Corrado explains: 
A character theory . . . does not have to be a utilitarian theory. A 
retributive theory of excuses . . . might assert that desert is the only 
appropriate basis for punishment. Only bad character deserves 
punishment, on such a theory, and we excuse cases in which the agent 
could not have done otherwise because the inability to do otherwise 
prevents the inference from the illegal act to the bad character. 
Corrado, supra note 8, at 470. 
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based on conclusions his act allows us to draw about the 
bad state of his character. George Fletcher, for example, 
argues that "[a]n inference from the wrongful act to the 
actor's character is essential to a retributive theory of 
punishment. "19 The claim of the latter ("character 
utilitarians") is that the criminal act allows for an inference 
to bad motivation or character, and that a system of 
punishment that penalizes on the basis of such features 
will maximize social welfare.20 
The integration of character into either a retributive or 
a utilitarian theory of punishment produces a character­
based theory of the excuses: If punishment is for bad states 
of character, then an excuse is warranted when an agent 
who has violated a criminal norm does not manifest the 
character defect we would normally infer from the act he 
performs. Thus a character retributivist would claim that 
a defendant who robs a bank under duress does not deserve 
to be punished. As Fletcher writes, "[IJf a bank teller opens 
a safe and turns money over to a stranger, we can infer 
that he is dishonest. But if he does all this at gunpoint, we 
cannot infer anything one way or the other about his 
honesty."21 A character utilitarian would say that there is 
utility only in punishing people who manifest bad 
character.22 On Richard Brandt's version of character 
utilitarianism, the thesis is spelled out in terms of 
motivation, rather than character.23 On this view, the 
purpose of the criminal law is to punish for defects of 
motivation; a worse defect of tnotivation should entail a 
more severe punishment. 24 The attending theory of the 
19. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 800. 
20. Brandt, supra note 9. 
21. Fletcher, supra note 7, at800. 
22. See Paul H. RobinSQn & John Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 453-499 (1997). 
23. Brandt himself seems to think the two equivalent, since he thinks of 
character as a "system of motivations." Brandt, supra note 9, at 171. 
24. Brandt writes: "if a worse defect of motivation is shown by intentional 
homicide than by reckless homicide, one might infer that the punishment for 
murder should be more severe than for manslaughter." Brandt, supra note 9, at 
170. 
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excuses would exempt an agent who commits an illegal act 
when that person did not manifest a defect of motivation: 
"a legally wrongful act ought to be subject to punishment 
only if the act manifested a defect of motivation."25 
The difference between the character and the choice 
theory can be captured in terms of two kinds of evaluations 
or judgments a person might make. 26 On the one hand, 
there is evaluation of a person in light of somethi�g he did, 
where we evaluate the person's action in isolation from 
facts about him that might explain why he behaved as he 
did. This form of evaluation is focused on action because it 
is concerned with whether the agent's behavior conformed 
to an external norm of permissibility. On the other hand, 
there is evaluation of an agent as a person, taken as a 
whole, where we are not particularly interested in whether 
his behavior conforms to a norm, but in whether he is a 
good or bad person, considered in a more general sort of 
way. The choice theorists think of criminal responsibility 
as a form of the first kind of evaluation, whereas the 
character theorists appear to think of it as a form of the 
second kind. 
While I am not prepared to defend the choice theorist's 
approach to criminal liability across the board, I do believe 
it has this over the character theory: the character theory 
appears to efface the distinction between the two kinds of 
evaluation outlined above. It confuses criminal 
responsibility with the kind of judgment that might 
interest a priest, a psychotherapist, or a governor deciding 
whether to grant clemency. The governor, for example, is 
truly concerned with the state of the criminal's soul. He 
wishes to know whether a terrible deed the criminal has 
performed is out of keeping with his overall moral worth, 
and so whether the criminal is a fitting object for an 
exercise of mercy. In order to decide whether the deed is in 
fact representative of the criminal as a person, the 
25. Id. 
26. For a slightly more extended discussion of the distinction, see Claire 
Finkelstein, The Irrelevance of the Intended to Prima Facie Culpability: Reply to 
Moore, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 335, 342-344 (1996). 
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governor wants to know what motivated the conduct, and 
whether the criminal has performed similar acts in the 
past. He is also interested in facts that have nothing to do 
with the wrongful act itself, such as whether the criminal 
would be a productive member of his community if 
returned to normal life, and whether others in society 
would benefit or be harmed by his release. Unlike a judge 
or members of a jury who are concerned with guilt or 
innocence, the governor's interest in the criminal's act is 
limited to the evidence it provides of that person's internal 
moral worth and of his future dangerousness. He has no 
more reason to be interested in what the criminal did on 
this occasion than he would be in any other manifestation 
of character or motivation. 27 
Despite the fact that the choice theory seems to better 
capture the basic form of evaluation in criminal law, it 
faces some important difficulties. In the next Part we will 
focus on the rational excuses, for it is here that the choice 
theory's shortcomings are most apparent. We will see first, 
that it is difficult to make sense of the rational excuses in 
the absence of the notion of a disposition, and second, that 
the choice theory's difficulty explaining responsibility for 
acts that arise "habitually" is what makes it unsuited to 
account for this class of defenses. 
27. Michael Corrado argues that the choice and character theories reduce to 
the same thing. The character theory claims that it is unfair to hold agents liable 
for acts that are out of character, but fair to hold them for acts in which their 
aettled dispositions are expressed. And as he understands the choice theory, it 
maintains that it is unfair to hold agents liable for actions caused or constrained 
by external forces, and fair to hold them for actions they themselves author. 
Since action that arises from a disposition or character trait is "internally" 
produced, he thinks both theories would hold agents responsible for bad acts that 
stem from the bad character traits they author. Michael Corrado, supra note 8, at 
479-80. I think, however, that Corrado misunderstands the choice theory in this 
context. An action that stems from a disposition is not separately willed in the 
sense the choice theorists have in mind, since it is not chosen in its own right. 
Rather, an action that stems from a character trait is a non-optional result of the 
earlier choice or choices that led to the development of the character trait in the 
first place. So although actions that stem from a disposition may be determined 
by something "inside" the agent, they are not chosen in the way the choice 
theorist requires. 
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III. RATIONAL EXCUSES AND THE CHOICE THEORY 
Consider the following instances where a defendant 
might claim partial or total exoneration. There is the case 
of the two sailors who are survivors of a shipwreck, trying 
to stay afloat by clinging to a plank in the water. The 
plank is strong enough to support only one, and the 
defendant saves his own life by pushing his fellow off it. 
There is the case of the person who commits a criminal act 
upon demand, after being threatened with the death of his 
loved ones by members of a criminal organization. There is 
the person who throws a hand grenade at a mob of young 
children who are wielding deadly weapons, where he 
believes this is the only way he can save his life. Or the 
case of the person enticed by a police officer into buying 
drugs, where the officer exerts intense pressure to induce 
the defendant to make the purchase. Finally, there is the 
person who meets his loved one's rapist unexpectedly, and 
attacks him in revenge, or the man who comes home to find 
his wife in bed with another man, and in a fit of rage, 
shoots them both dead. 
My suggestion is that the above cases have a common 
structure, despite their historically different treatment in 
the law. On the one hand, they are all cases in which the 
defendant can be held to account for his conduct, since he is 
fully in control of the criminal act. Indeed, there is a firmer 
basis for ascribing responsibility in such cases than control, 
since the defendant even performs the prohibited act 
intentionally, and not as a mere side effect of his behavior. 
But they are a1so cases in which the conduct is not justified 
by considerations of the greater social good. That is, the 
defendant cannot vindicate his conduct by claiming that he 
does more good than harm. Indeed, his reason for doing 
what he does in such cases is always personal. The value 
he perceives in the criminal act stems from the fact that it 
advances his interests or the interests of someone he cares 
about. Defenses of the above sort thus appear to hover 
between justifications and excuses, at least as these 
categories have been traditionally conceived. 
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What does the choice theorist do, then, when faced 
with these examples? The answer is that he squeezes them 
into the surrounding categories of social benefit, on the one 
hand, and diminished capacity, on the other, calling the 
first set of defenses "justifications" and the second set 
"excuses." The case of the men clinging to the plank, for 
example, might be treated as an instance of the 
justification of necessity, and the person who kills the 
children with the hand grenade could claim the 
justification of self-defense. The traditional account would 
explain this by assimilating such cases to more clear-cut 
examples of necessity and self-defense: the person who 
bums down a field to create a firebreak in order to prevent 
a town from being engulfed by flames; the person who 
attacks a malicious attacker in order to save himself from a 
lethal attack. On the other hand, the choice theorist would 
probably treat the person coerced into assisting in the 
performance of the criminal act and the person pressured 
into purchasing drugs as excused, according them the 
defenses of duress and entrapment respectively. The 
person who meets his loved one's assailant is thought 
entitled only to the partial excuse of extreme emotional 
disturbance or provocation. 28 These cases are treated as 
excuses by assimilating them to cases in which the 
defendant's conduct is involuntary or otherwise lacking in 
control. The Model Penal Code embodies the capacity 
theory perspective when it requires that the coercion be 
such "that a person of reasonable firmness in his situation 
would have been unable to resist. "'Zs Robinson, for example, 
writes that "the excusing condition in duress ia the 
impairment of the actor's ability to control his conduct. ttao 
And he argues that entrapment is like the duress defense, 
28. Under the traditional rules governing the provocation defense, merely 
encountering a loved one's assailant would be insufficient to generate a defense. 
The defendant must actually have witnessed the assault immediately prior to his 
own response. See, e.g., State v. Shane, 590 N.E.2d 272 (Ohio 1992) (rejecting 
claim of provocation for defendant who leamed verbally of 6ancoo's infidelity). 
29. Model Penal Code§ 2.09 (1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
30. 2 Robinson, supra note 16, § 177 (b)(l), at 351. 
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insofar as it is based on the idea that "the defendant's 
actions were not fully his own. "3l The choice theorist would 
see the person who merits a provocation defense as 
someone who lacks the capacity to restrain his emotions. 
He would prefer the psychological formulation of the 
defense to the traditional normative formulation. One 
would thus expect him to side with the Model Penal Code's 
extreme emotional disturbance formulation over the 
traditional provocation or "heat of passion, approach.32 
Evidence that something is amiss with the choice 
theory's approach, however, comes with the first group of 
examples we considered, the cases that would traditionally 
be called justifications. The problem with treating the 
plank case and the defense-against-children case as 
justifications is that they are all instances in which the 
criminal act is not particularly redeemed by considerations 
of social welfare. Is it truly better, from the standpoint of 
social utility, that one stranded sailor survive rather than 
another? The problem is that where each person is 
concerned, it is not better for the world that he survive, and 
so we cannot say, as between the two, which one would be 
entitled to push the other off the plank. That is, if the 
entitlement a person sometimes has to violate the law is 
based on the social utility of his doing so, then arguably we 
do not have a reason in a case like the plank case for siding 
with one man clinging to the plank over the other. And so 
we do not have a basis for finding one man justified in 
pushing the other off, that would not also lead us to 
conclude that the second man is justified in pushing the 
first man off. 
Admittedly, it is better that one stranded sailor 
survive than that none survive, and from this perspective 
the law ought to encourage someone to push someone else 
31. Id. § 209 (b), at 513. He does allow, however, that there is a different 
theory of the defense, based on the idea that it is a defense designed to deter 
improper police conduct. 
82. Cf. the "extreme emotional disturbance" defense of the Model Penal Code, 
§ 210.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962), and a traditional "heat of passion defense," 
such as Cal. Pen. Code § 192(a) (West 2002). 
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off. Why not say, then, that each is justified in pushing the 
other off the plank, since society would be better off if either 
one did so? Since the best social rule would probably allow 
each to try to push the other o!).e off, what impediment 
would there be to allowing the victor in such a contest to 
claim the benefit of justification once he succeeds? The 
problem with this solution has to do with the traditional 
approach to justification. According to the traditional logic, 
if A is justified in pushing B off the plank, it would follow 
that B is not justified in resisting A. That is, the 
traditional approach denies that each of two individuals 
can be simultaneously justified, if the actions they perform 
entitle each to oppose the other. From this it follows that 
neither man clinging to the plank could be justified, despite 
the fact that it might be socially beneficial if one were to 
push the other off.33 
One might, however, suppose such difficulties peculiar 
to the plank case, where the claimed entitlements over a 
common resource are exactly symmetrical. And if this were 
the case, we need not worry, since where cases of conflicting 
claims of justification are concerned, precise symmetry is 
rare. But in fact the problem is common to all cases in the 
in between category of defenses we are considering. Notice, 
for example, that we cannot explain the entitlement of the 
defendant to use lethal self-defense against the children in 
terms of social utility, since it is not particularly welfare­
maximizing for a large number of innocent children to die 
instead of for a single person attacked by those children to 
die. Indeed, from the standpoint of social utility, we should 
favor the children's lives over the victim's, since the former 
are more numerous. If the theorist is going t.o treat all self­
defense cases as instances of justification, then, he will have 
to conclude that a person is not entitled to defend himself 
against a mob of infantile aggressors, and that is surely the 
wrong result. 
33. For a further discussion of this case, see Claire Finkelstein, Two Men and 
a Plank, 7 Legal Theory 279 (2001). 
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On the social welfare approach to justification, that an 
act would increase the level of social utility provides a basis 
for allocating legal rights. But in the face of the argument 
just given, one might want to reject the social welfare view 
of justification, and argue that the legal rights that 
constitute justifications are identified by an underlying 
theory of moral rights instead. On this alternate view of 
justification, it would not be necessary for the prohibited 
act to be welfare�ma.ximizing in order for it to be legally 
justified. We would say that the person who violates the 
law in such cases is justified, because he is defending an 
antecedent moral right he has. Thus the person attacked 
by the blameless children would be entitled to defend 
himself against their aggression on the grounds that he 
had a moral right to do so, not on the grounds that he 
would thereby increase social welfare. 
But turning to a rights-based approach will not help 
with the above difficulty. For we still confront the problem 
of conflicting justifications we saw with the plank case. If 
A has a moral right to push B off the plank, B must have a 
symmetrical moral right to do the same to A. But if A is 
justified in pushing B off, B may not rightfully oppose him. 
Surely if B tries to push A off the plank, he is opposing A in 
his efforts to push B off. The same might be said for self­
defense. If the victim has a right to kill the child-attackers 
with a hand grenade, then surely the children must also 
have a right to defend themselves by, let us imagine, using 
a shield to lob the hand grenade back to the victim. But if 
this is so, then the victim's moral right to defend himself 
cannot provide the basis for a legal right of justification, 
since if the victim is justified in throwing the grenade, the 
children cannot be justified in using a shield to lob it back. 34 
So turning from a social welfare to a rights-based approach 
34. The situation is actually more complicated than this, since on many 
accounts of the nature of moral rights, the victim could not have a moral right 
that could be rightfully opposed either. For a discussion of such cases and the 
difficulties that surround them, see Claire Finkelstein, On the Obligation of the 
State to Extend a Right of Self-Defense to ita Citizens, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1361 
(1999). 
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to justification does not seem to make it easier to fit these 
cases into a justification framework. 
Now consider the two cases the choice theory would 
traditionally place under the heading "excuse." The 
classification there is equally problematic. For examplet in 
order to make duress cases consistent with the choice 
theozys approach to excuses, the theory must maintain 
that a defendant who acts under duress has lost control 
over his conduct. But what reason is there to suppose that 
this is the case? The person who decides to rob a bank 
under threat that his loved ones will be killed if he does not 
is not less in control of his conduct than the man who 
pushes the other person off the plank, or the person who 
attacks a mob of child assailants in self-defense. All three 
defendants act on the basis of reasons1 and the reasons, in 
both cases, are roughly the same: the agents wish to protect 
themselves or the lives of those they love. It is often said 
that the dP.fendant in a duress situation loses control 
because of the pressure of the situation in which he finds 
himself. But surely a person who is on the verge of 
drowning or a person who is about to be killed by a mob of 
children would be under at least as much psychological 
pressure. 
The same difficulty arises with the choice theozys 
approach to a person who violates the law under pressure 
from a law enforcement officer. What reason is there to 
believe that the defendant in such cases is not in control of 
his actions or that his conduct has somehow become 
involuntary? As Robinson himself admits, the entrapment 
defense cannot be consistently formulated in terms of lack 
of capacity, since if the person entrapped truly lacks the 
ability to conform his conduct to the law, the defendant 
who is induced by non-government agents to violate the law 
should also have a defense.35 
35. Robinson somewhat equivocally concludes that the entrapment defense 
"probably reflects a combination of concerns including an estoppel notion that it is 
unfair to permit the entity that has entrapped to then punish." 2 Robinson, supra 
note 16, § 2.09 (b), at 516. 
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The partial defense of provocation comes closer to 
fitting the capacity model, since such cases at least involve 
an altered psychological condition. But it is not quite 
accurate to think of emotional upset as a loss in a person's 
capacity to control his conduct. To see this, notice that if a 
person who encounters his daughter's rapist at a social 
gathering is excused because he lacks the ability to conform 
his conduct to the law, then someone who encounters his 
daughter's ex�fianc� should also have a partial defense if 
his anger over the broken engagement is what led him to 
attack the victim. Or if the person who finds his wife in 
bed with another man receives a defense for killing her 
and/or her paramour because he is unable to control his 
rage, then the person who finds his ex girlfriend in bed 
with her husband in their own home should also have a 
partial defense, assuming he too kills out of jealousy. Yet 
the law does not hand out partial defenses to people who 
kill simply because they lose their tempers. And that 
suggests that lack of capacity is not the reason we 
exonerate in such cases. Instead, the law offers a defense 
in situations in which any reasonable person would have 
done the same. The defense is thus at least partially based 
on a normative stance we take towards people's emotional 
reactions, and not primarily on a judgment that they are no 
longer responsible agents. 
If fully responsible defendants who choose to violate 
the law are to be afforded a defense, it must be because the 
law endorses the content of the reasons on which they act. 
But it is not clear in any of these cases why the law would 
endorse the agent's reason tbr acting, since there is no 
reason for the law to favor the illegal act over the legal :rule 
it contravenes. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the 
defendant's behavior is endorsed on a rights-based theory 
of justification, since these are cases in which it is 
problematic to think of any moral right the defendant 
might have as giving rise to a legal right to violate the law. 
In the face of these difficulties, the choice theory retreats 
from the traditional claims about social utility to a 
psychological claim about diminished capacity. But there 
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is no basis for thinking of most of the above defendants as 
lacking in capacity either. In particular, the defendants 
who would have "excuses" on this view are typically as 
much in control of their conduct as the defendants who 
would no�ally have "justifications." There is thus reason 
to think that the explanation for defenses of the above sort 
has eluded the traditional theorists, and that some 
rethinking of the grounds for such defenses is in order. 
I have set forth the difficulties with the choice theory's 
approach to the rational excuses in greater detail 
elsewhere.38 I shall not, therefore, elaborate on that theory 
further here. Let us then turn to the character theory 
instead. 
IV. RATIONAL EXCUSES AND THE CHARACTER THEORY 
The character theory holds out hope of a better account 
of the rational excuses, insofar as it is sensitive to the 
underlying dispositions from which criminal acts can arise. 
Most helpfully, the character theory has no need to treat 
the excuses in terms of diminished capacity, since it allows 
that we can excuse conduct performed by responsible 
agents. It thus contemplates a normative basis for 
excusing defendants under certain circumstances. This is 
attractive, first, because it provides a less distorting 
account of some of the defenses with which we are 
concerned, and second, because it holds out the hope of 
accounting for the defenses we are calling rational excuses 
in a unified way. 
Perhaps the most compelling case that the character 
theory can explain the rational excuses can be made with 
respect to the defense of entrapment. There courts are 
explicit, under at least one line of cases, that the defendant 
merits a defense when pressured by law enforcement 
agents into breaking the law, unless the prosecution can 
36. Finkelstein, Duress, supra note 10. I did not label the view I was 
criticizing as such in that article. But insofar as my criticisms were directed 
towards the traditional approach to the excuses, the choice theory was my 
implicit target. 
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show that the defendant was "predisposed" to commit the 
legal violation anyway. The cases suggest that if a 
defendant possessed the relevant disposition, the fact that 
a law enforcement officer pressured him into committing a 
crime should not provide a defense. A defendant will thus 
be entitled to a defense if his character is good, meaning 
that he is not normally disposed to violate the law, and he 
will lack a defense if his character is bad, meaning that he 
is inclined to violate the law. Arguably, this same analysis 
can be extended to cases of duress, as well as to some self­
defense and personal necessity cases. While the case law 
does not explicitly bear out the emphasis on character in 
the way that the entrapment cases do, the character 
theorist might nevertheless maintain that the reason we 
extend these defenses where we do is that they apply to 
situations in which we cannot infer anything negative 
about the character of the defendant who violates the law, 
despite the fact that a criminal violation would normally 
allow us to draw that inference. 
Despite its superficial appeal, the character theory 
turns out to possess a series of flaws that make it 
ultimately unable to provide an account of criminal 
responsibility generally, and of the rational excuses in 
particular. I shall begin by considering several objections 
to the character theory of a general sort, and then move on 
to its specific shortcomings with respect to the rational 
excuses. 
First, the law simply does not seem terribly interested 
in character when it makes determinations of guilt and 
innocence, or even when it determines the appropriate 
sentence for a person found guilty. In particular, having a 
bad character is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
justified punishment. It is not necessary, because a person 
with a good character can commit a terrible crime, and 
while the evidence of his good character may serve to 
influence his sentence within a certain limited range, the 
effect of a good character on the sentence of a person who 
has committed a very serious infraction is marginal. It is 
not sufficient, because no matter how bad a person's 
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character, he cannot be punished unless he has violated 
one of the criminal law's prohibitory norms. People who 
are chronically ungenerous, or who regularly deceive others 
about small matters in order to better themselves, probably 
have bad characters, or at least bad character traits. But 
we do not normally think they deserve to suffer 
punishment for such traits. The motivational version of 
the character theory is subject to the same criticism: it is 
neither necessary nor sufficient that a person have a bad 
motive to warrant criminal punishment. It is not 
necessary, because the person who holds up a liquor store 
cannot defend himself by pointing out that he intended to 
give the money to the March of Dimes. And it is not 
sufficient, because people may do all sorts of things with 
the hope of harming their fellows that the law does not 
attempt to prohibit. The problem, fro� the character and 
motivation theorists' perspective, then, is that neither is 
able to offer a clear principle that accurately distinguishes 
those immoral or ill-motivated deeds that are criminalized 
from those that are not.87 Whatever principle the character 
theorist might present, he surely cannot avoid the 
conclusion that we do not criminalize bad character per se. 
Second is an evidentiary point: Character theorists 
depend on the claim that where the excuses do not apply, 
we can infer something about the character of a person 
from the criminal act he performs. But there seems no 
reason to suppose this is correct. In some contexts, the fact 
that a person was willing to violate the law says something 
good about his character-it might suggest, for example, 
that he is so driven by his moral convictions that he is 
willing to expose himself to a risk of punishment in order to 
defend them. This is surely the case when the defendant 
takes himself to be violating an unjust law or when he is 
pursuing charitable ends. Robin Hood provides the most 
famous example, but there is also the savvy detective, the 
street-wise cop, or the activist lawyer, all of whom play a 
37. See Leo Katz's contribution to the present volume for m any more 
examples of immoral agents, most of whom could be said to have bad characters, 
but whom we would not want to punish. 
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bit fast and loose with rules of police conduct or rules of 
evidence in their pursuit of the bad guy. Typically the laws 
they violate seem formalistic and unimportant, and the 
motive from which they act pure and noble. Thus the fact 
that the defendant commits a criminal act simply does not 
supply reliable evidence about the merits of his underlying 
character. The same is true when we try to infer motive, 
instead of character, from the performance of an illegal act. 
Not only will the law refuse to exonerate the compassionate 
and well-motivated mercy killer, but it will even treat him 
offense as a more serious one than that of the jealous lover 
who kills in the heat of passion.38 Yet we surely do not 
think that a wife who helps her beloved husband end his 
suffering from a terminal disease necessarily acts on a 
worse motive than the person who kills his wife's paramour 
when he discovers the couple in flagrante delicto. We must 
conclude that bad motive, like bad character, is simply not 
a good correlate for criminal liability. 
The most important difficulty with the character 
theory for our purposes, however, is the account it offers of 
action performed on the basis of a disposition or character 
trait. For the account of dispositions it offers makes it 
unsuitable for explaining defenses predicated on that 
notion. The problem stems from the fact that character 
theorists overlook a central psychological fact about 
character traits, namely that they produce actions semi· 
automatically. Once the nature of such actions is fully 
understood, it should be clear that it is not possible to use 
character in the way the character theorist proposes. The 
problem is that the semi-automatic nature of actions 
expressing a disposit!on ma.ltes them f. . .mction like an 
intervening condition between the agent's formation of his 
character and the action that later results from that 
character trait. For this reason, responsibility for 
character does not translate into responsibility for the acts 
that follow from those traits. 
38. See Model Penal Code § 210.2 & § 210.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
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Let us focus on the notion of a disposition, rather than 
on the narrower notion of a character trait. Dispositions 
are simply entrenched patterns of behavior; they need not 
be morally valenced. The salient feature of dispositions, 
which traits of character share, is that they are at least 
partly habitual, and require less involvement from the 
agent's rational faculties than ordinary willed action. Once 
a person has acquired a generous disposition, for example, 
the decision of whether to give to others is no longer 
entirely a matter of choice. Indeed it is this feature that 
makes it helpful to acquire dispositions in the first place. 
Because acts that stem from a disposition require less of an 
effort of will than those that are sui generis, having a 
disposition makes actions of the relevant sort easier to 
perform. Thus the generous person finds it easier to 
perform acts of generosity than the stingy person, because 
she has g standing set of responses in circumstances calling 
for generous acts. Instead of deliberating about what to do 
when an opportunity for generosity arises, she may often 
simply find herself performing such acts when the situation 
calls for them. And this is because �he takes performing 
generous acts in certain circumstances as a non-optional 
end towards which she strives. Her practical reflections 
consist entirely in trying to figure out how to perform the 
generous act, not in whether to perform it.39 We often 
capture this by saying that doing · the generous thing 
"comes naturally" to such a person, by which we mean that 
the person does it with little reflection or internal debate. 
It is important, however, not to obscure the fact that 
actions that stem from a disposition are still fully 
intentional, and thus ultimately remain up to the agent. 
An experienced driver, for example, may shift gears largely 
39. Aristotle says something similar about the notion of character. He says, 
"that which is in truth an object of wish is an object of wish to the good man," and 
also, famously, that "We deliberate not about ends, but about means." Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics, in The Basic Works of Aristotle 971, 970 {Richard McKeon 
ed., W.O. Ross trans., Random House 1941). Together, these passages suggest 
that the virtuous man simply takes objects of virtue as his end, without 
deliberating about them. His deliberation is only about how to realize the 
virtuous ends he takes as given. 
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without reflection. The absence of deliberation does not 
negate the driver's control over his bodily movements. His 
control lies in the fact that the driver remains capable of 
rejecting his habitual movements in favor, say, of shifting 
gears at an unaccustomed moment or in an unusual 
pattern or manner. The point of acquiring the habit is not 
literally to make it impossible for the driver to do anything 
other than perform his habitual bodily movements, but to 
make it substantially more difficult for him to do so. This 
is why the driver can rely on his ability to perform the right 
actions at the right time: The fact that the movements 
required for shifting gears have become habitual makes it 
easy for the driver to execute them.40 
Like the experienced driver, the actions of the person 
with a disposition display the following combination of 
features: First, we are assuming that the agent is 
responsible for the acquisition of her own disposition.41 
Second, the actions to which the relevant dispositions give 
rise are fully voluntary and intentional. Yet, third, the 
actions displaying the disposition are executed largely 
without the agent's rational deliberation. Just as the 
driver would have to struggle to force himself to adopt an 
unaccustomed pattern of shifting, so it would take an effort 
of will for the generous person not to respond with 
generosity. It is for this reason, I am suggesting, that 
actions that proceed from a disposition are less under the 
rational control of the agent who performs them. While 
they are still fundamentally up to the agent, an individual 
will have to fight his own dispositions to act other than the 
40. For a discussion oi expert behavior, see Hubert L. Dreyfus & Stuart E. 
Dreyfus, Mind Over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the 
Era of the Computer (1986). 
41. The assumption actually may be a questionable one. In particular, it  
appears to stand in some conflict with the law's assumption that the fact that a 
defendant had a rotten social background should entitle him to at least partial 
mitigation of his sentence. For if the law supposes that a defendant desenres to 
be exonerated for a bad act he performed on the grounds that his background 
shaped him in a way that made him violate the law, then the law seems to be 
assuming that human beings are not responsible for their characters after all. In 
what follows I shall assume the Aristotelian thesis throughout nonetheless, since 
debating this point will take us too far afield. 
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disposition would indicate. Alternatively, if the disposition 
is very well established and very controlling, the agent may 
actually have to alter the disposition before he can alter the 
course of action he would otherwise perform. Thus while 
agents acting under the weight of a disposition control the 
actions they perform, the control they exert is indirect: 
control over the action operates through control over the 
acquisition and maintenance of the disposition from which 
the action issues. 
But if the person who acts on a disposition is still capable 
of acting against the weight of his disposition, why would the 
fact that an act stems from a disposition provide a basis for 
exonerating an agent who perfonns it? To see why 
dispositions might diminish an agent's culpability for a bad 
act he perfonns, consider the behavior of a drug addict trying 
to satisfy his pangs of addiction. On the one hand, in most 
cases the addict is fully responsible for his addiction, in 
roughly the same way that Aristotle posited for virtuous and 
vicious actions: The agent gave himself the disposition by 
repeatedly performing acts of the sort the disposition 
involves. The addict's bodily movements remain under his 
control, even when he is most fully in the grip of his addiction. 
Evidence for this lies in the fact that he will surely be capable 
of instrumental reasoning about each act he perfonns. He 
may deliberate rather carefully about where and how to 
administer the drug to himself, and he may even have the 
capacity to adopt relatively long-term plans in pursuit of his 
end. But despite the fact that he controlled the onset of the 
addiction in the first place, and the fact that he performs the 
actions intentionally that manifest the addiction, it is no 
longer up to t.'l).e addict whether or not to take the drugs. 
There is thus a sense in which the addiction vitiates the 
addict's ultimate responsibility: Although he is responsible for 
becoming an addict in the first place, that responsibility does 
not transfer to particular acts performed in satisfaction of 
that addiction, even acts that are properly speaking 
intentional. For, like the generous person we considered 
above, taking the drug has become a non-optional end in 
pursuit of which he must act. 
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I have been arguing, against the character theorist, 
that even if we grant that agents are responsible for their 
dispositions or characters, they are not necessarily morally 
responsible for the acts that follow from those dispositions. 
This is so, despite the fact that the actions that follow from 
the disposition are intentional actions, and thus are at 
least indirectly subject to an agent's control. There is, 
however, an odd consequence of my argument. On the line 
I am suggesting, the generous person is not particularly 
praiseworthy for acts of generosity, and the miser is not 
terribly criticizable for acts of stinginess. While each may 
be praiseworthy or blameworthy for being the sorts of 
people they are, neither can be praised or blamed for acting 
as they do, given that their actions follow from deeply 
ingrained dispositions. Since the generous person cannot 
particularly help doing the generous thing, he is merely 
acting as he must in giving to others. By contrast, if the 
miser were to be as generous as the generous person, he 
would be much praised for his act, since acts of generosity 
would be particularly impressive coming from him, given 
how difficult it is for him to perform them. 
I believe, nevertheless, that this is a defensible upshot 
of the view of dispositions I have been articulating. It is 
consistent with a Kantian perspective on the moral worth 
of human action. Recall Kant's remarks about the 
shopkeeper who returns the correct change to his clients.42 
Kant says that if the shopkeeper does this because he is a 
person of sympathetic temperament, his action has no 
moral worth. It is only when he does it against the weight 
of present inclination that his action has moral worth, 
because only then can we be sure it stems from the will and 
is motivated by the thought of duty. Kant thinks that only 
actions performed against the weight of an agent's 
inclinations can have moral worth, since otherwise an 
agent's dutiful acts are motivated by pleasure. Such acts 
42. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals 65 (H. J. Paton 
trans., Harper & Row 1964). 
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would not be entirely freely chosen; they would, in Kant's 
terms, be "heteronomous," rather than fully "autonomous." 
In a similar vein, I am arguing that actions performed 
against the weight of an agent's dispositions are most 
directly the product of an agent's deliberative faculties, and 
so are the actions for which he is most particularly 
responsible. While character theorists are intent on seeing 
action that stems from standing dispositions as most 
emblematic of moral agency, I am suggesting that we have 
reason to think of dispositions as standing in opposition to 
rational agency, insofar as the action they produce requires 
less from the will of the agent than would an action chosen 
for its own sake. If this is correct, then it is action that is 
out of character for the agent that most bears the stamp of 
its author's moral agency, because such action is most 
chosen. The result is problematic for the character 
theorist's approach to the excuses. If the character theorist 
were correct that we could infer nothing about the 
character of the person who participates in a crime at 
knife-point, that would tend to inculpate him for the crime, 
rather than suggest a reason why he should not be held 
responsible. Moreover, if we could draw an inference from 
bad act to bad character trait, that would tend to exculpate, 
rather than to inculpate. So the character theorist appears 
to have matters exactly backwards when he claims that the 
reason we give an agent an "excuse" is that the action he 
performs is not emblematic of his character. He is, if 
anything, more responsible for action that is out of 
character than for action that is in keeping with his 
deepest traits. 
Having seen that the character theory will not provide 
us with a satisfactory approach to criminal responsibility, 
let us proceed to consider the nature of the rational excuses 
more specifically. As we shall see, we must deploy 
dispositions in quite a different way from the way the 
character theorist we have just considered does. 
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V. RATIONAL EXCUSES AND ADAPTIVE DISPOSITIONS 
The account of the rational excuses I shall develop is 
one I presented in preliminary form in two earlier articles, 
one dealing with the duress defense and the other with 
self-defense.43 In those articles, I argued for a reversal of 
the usual appeal to character proposed by the character 
theorist: Duress and self-defense, I claimed, do not 
exonerate because people who act under these kinds of 
pressures behave in ways that are "out of character." 
Instead, it is precisely because such acts stem from settled 
dispositions in the agent that we are inclined to allow a 
defense under these circumstances. I argued that we 
exonerate in such cases because the act the agent performs 
in violation of the law stems from standing features of his 
motivational set, features we are prepared to endorse. 
Duress and self-defense are cases in which we cannot 
eliminate the legal violation without eliminating the 
disposition from which it arose. In this Part, I shall 
attempt to generalize the arguments I made in the context 
of these specific defenses to the wider class of rational 
excuses. 
On the theory of the excuses I would like to propose, 
rational excuses are cases in which the question of the 
agent's responsibility for the criminal act refers us to the 
larger choice of disposition from which the agent acted. We 
can explain defenses like duress, self-defense, entrapment, 
and personal necessity along these lines, because such 
defenses constitute claims that the disposition that 
produced the defendant's wrongdoing is itself socially 
beneficial. Thus the reason we afford defendfl._nt.s an excuse 
in such cases is that we do not want to discourage 
individuals from adopting the relevant dispositions. We 
shall see presently why this is the case. 
The account I am presenting is largely consistent with 
the choice theorist's account. For it accepts the choice 
theorist's basic premise that human beings are responsible 
43. Finkelstein, supra note 10. 
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for conduct in which they choose to engage. But it 
recognizes, first, that a certain category of defenses calls 
into play the notion of a disposition, and second, that choice 
operates differently where a disposition is at issue than 
where it is not. The person who acts on the basis of a 
disposition exercises choice, but usually not with respect to 
individual actions. Instead, he must choose between 
opposing or reinforcing the disposition, that is, he either 
stands in the way of the disposition or continues to allow it 
full force. In a case in which a person acts on a bad 
disposition, his responsibility for the ensuing bad act is 
based on a kind of omission-similar to the choice a person 
might make not to oppose another agent who was about to 
do something terrible. Of course a person is not 
responsible for all the results of his inaction. He is only 
responsible for harmful results that occur through his 
inaction if he had a duty to prevent those results. A person 
has a duty to prevent the results of his own bad 
dispositions where the operation of that disposition will 
result in a bad act. Assuming, then, that it is possible, 
however difficult, to refrain from acting on a disposition, a 
person is responsible for the bad acts he performs that 
result from bad dispositions, because he has a duty to 
oppose even a semi�automatic process of which he is the 
cause and which he controls. But he has no obligation to 
stop himself from acting on a good disposition, even when it 
produces a bad act, because it is morally commendable that 
he has that disposition. In particular, the law grants a 
defense in such cases, in recognition of the fact that if the 
agent were to stop himself from acting on the disposition 
every time it produced a bad act, he would be in danger of 
losing the disposition altogether. 
The dispositional account of the rational excuses will 
diverge from the choice theorist's account in relatively few 
places, since the instances in which dispositions play a role 
remain relatively few. Disposition is still irrelevant to the 
theory of inculpation, and it is irrelevant to defenses other 
than the rational excuses. Thus the theory does not extend 
to excuses involving involuntary conditions, such as 
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epilepsy, or to conditions that impair an agent's rational 
faculties, such as infancy, insanity, or involuntary 
intoxication. The choice theorist is correct to think of these 
as lack of capacity defenses, since a person who has a 
tendency to suffer epileptic seizures cannot be said to have 
an "epileptic disposition;" nor can a non-rational child be 
thought of as having a disposition to act irrationally or non­
rationally. Conditions that impair capacity are preclusive 
of the exercise of dispositions, since dispositions operate 
through, rather than in lieu of, an agent's rational 
faculties. The theory also does not affect the analysis of 
what we might call "true justifications," namely cases in 
which the agent claims a privilege based on the impersonal 
benefits he supplies for society at large. For these are 
cases in which the defendant's act, considered in and of 
itself, is commendable. His defense therefore does not 
depend on the merits of the disposition from which he acts. 
Thus far my reference to "good" dispositions has been 
entirely generic. We must now consider in what sense the 
dispositions the rational excuses reflect are "good," as well 
as to address the question of why the law might want to 
privilege them. My more specific claim is that the rational 
excuses involve what I shall call "adaptive" dispositions, 
meaning that they are dispositions an agent acquires in 
pursuing his own welfare, but which generate collective 
gains for members of society as a whole. That is, to the 
extent that everyone adopts the dispositions in question, 
there will be collective gains that leave each person better 
off than he would be in the absence of those dispositions. 
My argument is that because there are gains to everyone 
from the widespread adoption of these dispositions, we 
often tolerate their operation when they lead individuals to 
violate the law. 
To illustrate, consider the fact that people who acquire 
dispositions to keep promises will be able to enter into 
cooperative ventures with one another for mutual benefit. 
The well-known example of the Humean farmers will make 
this clear. Alfred's field is ready for plowing this week, and 
Bertram's field will be ready next week. Neither farmer 
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can plow his field by himself. Alfred proposes that Bertram 
help him plow his field this week, and in exchange Alfred 
will help Bertram next week. If Alfred can convince 
Bertram that he intends to keep his promise to plow 
Bertram's field next week, it would be rational for Bertram 
to agree to Alfred's proposal, since both will be better off 
than if they do not enter into such an agreement. But can 
Alfred convince Bertram? In answering this question, we 
should assume that there are no further benefits to Alfred 
from plowing Bertram's field. That is, Alfred would gain no 
reputational advantage by doing so, nor will there be any 
future course of dealings between Alfred and Bertram that 
would make it advantageous to either to cooperate now. In 
addition, we assume there i� no legal or other coercive 
enforcement of any agreement the two farmers might 
make. 
In the absence of reputational incentives or other 
external sources of benefit from cooperation, it is hard to 
see how it could be to Alfred's benefit to make good on his 
promise to help Bertram next week. For once Bertram has 
already helped Alfred, there will be no further benefit to 
Alfred from keeping his promise. But if this is so, and if 
Bertram is rational, and he and Alfred each has know ledge 
of the other's rationality, Bertram will not help Alfred. The 
result is that both will be left worse off than if they were 
able to cooperate. Suppose, on the other hand, that 
Bertram knows that Alfred is a very reliable promise 
keeper. and that he keeps promises even when it is not to 
his benefit to do so. Then Bertram will be more inclined to 
believe Alfred•s promise. and so will cooperate with him. In 
cases of this sort, then, there will be mutual gains from the 
acquisition of a disposition. If agents can acquire 
dispositions like promise keeping, they will be able to make 
use of them to convince one another to enter into otherwise 
unenforceable cooperative arrangements that accrue to the 
benefit of both. It is for this reason that dispositions to 
keep promises and to cooperate with others are "adaptive," 
despite the fact that their operation does not always 
348 BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:317 
maximize an agent's welfare in the context of the choice the 
agent must make.44 
Notice that adaptive dispositions function something 
like pre-commitment devices. A pre-commitment device is 
an external mechanism for ensuring that people keep their 
commitments, which works by altering the payoffs to 
remove any benefits from violating those commitments. A 
disposition accomplishes the same result by way of internal 
commitment instead. Unlike an actual pre-commitment 
device, however, an adaptive disposition achieves 
compliance without exacting a penalty for non-compliance. 
An agent who acquires an adaptive disposition has 
"internalized" the penalty for non-compliance that external 
pre-commitment devices supply. She feels moved to honor 
her commitments without the fear of the kind of sanction 
an external pre-commitment device would impose. The 
disposition works to produce compliance with a social norm 
because it acts as a filter on the admissible options from 
which an agent who possess the relevant disposition can 
choose.45 Moreover, a disposition is in some respects 
preferable to a pre-commitment device. In particular, pre­
commitment devices have costs that dispositions do not 
appear to have. And if individuals can achieve cooperative 
behavior in the absence of incurring such costs, there will 
be a surplus for the parties to divide that potentially leaves 
both parties better off. 
To see the costs of pre-commitment devices more 
clearly, suppose in order for Alfred to convince Bertram he 
intends to make good on his promise to help him plow his 
field, Alfred must hire someone to break his kneecaps if he 
fails to render the promised assistance. He must pay the 
enforcer $50, let us say. At that price, it is still worth it to 
Alfred to enter into the agreement with Bertram, since the 
44. For an argument that reciprocating in such eases in the absence of pre­
commitment strategies, reputations! effects, or other exogenous pay-offs from 
cooperation, see David Gauthier, Resolute Choice and Rational Deliberation: A 
Critique and a Defense, 31 Noils 1 (1997); David Gauthier, Assure and Threaten, 
104 Ethics 690 (1994). 
45. Michael E. Bratman, Intention, Plans and Practical Reason (1987). 
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benefit he will receive from having help with his own field 
will more than make up for the cost of the pre-commitment. 
But clearly Alfred would be better off if he could convince 
Bertram of his sincerity without having to pay the enforcer. 
If he had a promise-keeping disposition, he would reap the 
benefits of cooperation with Bertram, without having to 
pay enforcement costs. And if acquiring the relevant 
adaptive disposition is truly something agents control, then 
it would be irrational for someone to proceed by way of pre· 
commitment instead. Thus I am suggesting that we 
tolerate violations of our primary norms to make room for 
the operation of dispositions because if we did not, it would 
be much more costly for us to achieve cooperative behavior. 
For we would have to make use of legal norms instead of 
informal mechanisms, and such mechanisms would involve 
substantial additional enforcement costs. 
In the context of the rational excuses, I am suggesting 
that dispositions like loyalty to loved ones or strongly self­
preferring commitments are adaptive, in · the sense that 
there are collective gains from the possession of those 
dispositions overall, despite the fact that they sometimes 
lead agents to break the law. It might be better if we did 
not allow a defense to individuals who are threatened with 
death or serious bodily injury, since at the margins that 
will result in more coercion, and hence in more crime. And 
in many cases, it will result specifically in a greater evil 
rather than a lesser one, since a person may have a duress 
defense even if the danger with which he is threatened is 
not graver than the criminal act he is asked to perform.411 
But we could not penalize the legal violation in this case 
without also penalizing the possession of the disposition 
46. While the defense of duress is generally not allowed as a defense to 
murder, many commentators think the restriction makes little sense. See, e.g., 
Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Criminal Law 438 (2d. ed. 1986) ("It is not 
proper, on principle, to limit the defense of duress to situations where the 
instrument of coercion is a threat of death or serious bodily injury. A threat to do 
bodily harm less than serious bodily harm, or a threat to destroy property or 
reputation, ought to do . . .  "); see also 2 Robinson, supra note 16, § 177(c)(2), at 
354 (arguing that the relevant consideration is "the nature of the actor's state of 
coercion and his ability to resist it"). 
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that led to that violation. And since there are cooperative 
gains from the underlying adaptive disposition, we do not 
wish to discourage the disposition in this way. 
But someone might offer the following objection to the 
argument I have been making. The fact that there are 
mutual gains from allowing agents to develop adaptive 
dispositions does not seem to require us to accept the 
operation of such dispositions in instances in which the 
disposition is not socially advantageous . That is, if we 
would truly prefer that a person who possessed adaptive 
dispositions followed the primary legal norm, why not use 
legal rules to police the line between the instances of, say, 
loyalty we want and the instances of loyalty we do not 
want? Why must we suffer with the results of loyalty in a 
case in which that sentiment leads an agent to violate one 
of the law's prohibitory norms, such as the norm against 
killing? 
The answer is that the operation of the disposition 
cannot be policed so precisely. A disposition is an imprecise 
mechanism for bringing about socially cooperative 
behavior. On the one hand, the costs of trying to enforce 
the disposition in non-legal contexts would be much too 
high. Consider the "costs, of attempting legally to enforce a 
disposition like loyalty in every instance in which we would 
like one another to be loyal. Social commitments, marriage 
promises, gratuitous exchanges among close friends or 
family would all become the subject of legally enforceable 
exchanges. Forming dispositions is a preferable way of 
binding one another than explicit pre-commitment devices, 
since the latter involve costs that achieving cooperative 
behavior by way of dispositions would not. On the other 
hand, it is also very difficult to suppress the disposition in 
those instances in which we would prefer it did not operate. 
Thus in order to be able to rely on the correct operation of 
the disposition in those instances in which we want them, 
we must tolerate their operation in some cases in which we 
do not. Where an adaptive disposition conflicts with a legal 
prohibitory norm, we sometimes exempt the agent for his 
responsibility for having violated the latter. 
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In particular, the adaptive dispositions that are of 
relevance to explaining the rational excuses are among the 
most fundamental to mutually beneficial social 
arrangements. They are dispositions like self-preservation, 
which lead a person to prefer her own life over the lives of 
others. Hence we allow a defense of self-defense, even in 
cases in which social welfare would be better served if the 
defendant could forego the conduct by which he violates the 
law, because, for example, more innocent blood would be 
shed if the agent acted on the self-preserving disposition 
than would be if the agent acted otherwise. In cases like 
that of the child attackers, society might be better served if 
the defendant chose not to save his life. But a society of 
mutual benefit cannot function if individuals do not seek to 
preserve themselves and enhance their own well-being. 
Personal necessity, such as the case of the men clinging to 
the plank, is also a clear example of agents violating a 
prohibitory nonn because they are disposed to choose their 
own survival over the lives of others. Once again, it is a 
disposition we endorse, even though society would 
presumably have no objection, and indeed might prefer, if a 
person chose to sacrifice himself to save another under the 
circumstances. Indeed, the disposition of prudence is so 
fundamental to a society founded on principles of mutual 
advantage that self-preserving acts may seem to be closer 
to justifications than excuses. That would explain why self­
defense and necessity have traditionally been considered 
justifications rather than excuses, despite the fact that 
social welfare is not always directly enhanced when agents 
engage in self-preferring acts. 
The exception to the overwhelming importance of self­
preferring dispositions is when agents are motivated to 
protect members of their family or others to whom they 
have developed special attachments. Thus the defenses of 
duress and provocation are sometimes issued to make room 
for other-oriented dispositions, even when they go awry 
and lead individuals to kill those they love. Not every case 
of duress or provocation takes this form. In many 
instances, the defendant is acting on a self-preferring 
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motive, as is the case when the coercion he experiences 
threatens him with death or bodily injury if he does not 
commit a crime, or when a person is provoked by insults 
that incite his self-protective feelings. But where the 
coercion operates by threatening the well-being of a loved 
one, or where a person is provoked by feelings of jealously, 
the dispositions in question are other-oriented. 
Entrapment is similarly a defense in which the 
defendant's willingness to violate the law is arguably other­
oriented. But here the disposition operates in an 
attenuated sense. A defendant's susceptibility to the 
blandishments of a police officer or other law-enforcement 
agent is an understandable result of his being the sort of 
person who cooperates readily with others. He is subject to 
persuasion because he is a social being, and he wants to be 
helpful and cooperative with a person who invites his 
assistance or encouragement. Admittedly, there are 
complications here. It is puzzling, for example, that the 
defense of entrapment is limited to cases in which the 
defendant receives pressure from a governmental agent. 
For if the entrapment defense were understood as 
accommodating a social disposition in the way I have 
described, one might expect similar pressure from a non­
governmental official to entitle a defendant to a defense as 
welL It is at least in part for this reason that some 
commentators are inclined to see entrapment as a non­
exculpatory defense, similar to the diplomatic immunity or 
double jeopardy defenses. 47 And it must be admitted that 
some applications of the defense seem to fit this model best, 
such as cases where the defendant is afforded a defense 
because the government has engaged in conduct that is 
simply too reprehensible to allow it to prosecute the 
defendant for his bad conduct.48 Probably the defense 
should be thought of as non-exculpatory in these kinds of 
cases. But the heart of the doctrine seems taken up by 
cases in which the defense is exculpatory: the reason the 
47. See 2 Robinson, supra note 16. 
48. I am grateful to Peter Westen for emphasizing the distinction between the 
different kinds of entrapment cases. 
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defendant merits exoneration in such cases is that the 
defendant would not have violated the law without 
pressure from the governmental agent. In such cases, it is 
plausible to explain the defense by saying that the 
defendant is manifesting a cooperative disposition. And 
since the disposition is in evidence in cases in which the 
instigating agent is a private citizen, we should probably 
extend the defense to such cases.49 
A point of clarification before I close this section. It is 
common to think of excuse as applying to actions society 
would prefer were not performed, actions where we would 
ideally wish the agent to abide by the law, but where we 
exonerate him for violating it. By arguing that some cases 
of self-defense, some cases of necessity, duress, 
entrapment, and other defenses should be conceived of as 
"rational excuses," I may appear to be suggesting that we 
would prefer the individual attacked by small children to 
stay his hand and not to kill them in defense, or for the 
starving individual to refrain from stealing the loaf of 
bread. I have indeed written thus far as if this were the 
case, by saying that the law "tolerates" a violation of its 
primary norms in cases in which the violation stems from 
an adaptive disposition. But I must now qualify that claim 
somewhat. In some cases it is clearly correct that we are 
prepared to grant a defense or partial defense, despite the 
fact that we would "prefer" that the defendant have 
conformed to the prohibitory norm. This would most 
obviously he the case in instances where the provocation 
defense might apply. But it is a much more tenuous 
description in self..defense, personal necessity, or duress 
cases, where we normally do not think the defendant ought 
to sacrifice himself to save the lives of innocent attackers, 
to avoid violating a prohibitory norm that does not pertain 
to loss of life, or to avoid committing a crime. We do not 
necessarily wish that the defendant allow himself or his 
49. In this regard, however, the dispositional approach I am proposing here 
does not lag behind character theory approaches, since the character theorist 
cannot distinguish good character from bad according to the identity of the 
entrapping agent. 
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loved ones to die in order to avoid assisting in the 
commission of a crime. Indeed, we often recognize the 
defendant's entitlement to defend his own life or the lives of 
others. This is most obviously the case, for example, in 
self-defense cases, where we tend to think the defendant is 
acting from a claim of right in defending his life, even if he 
must threaten the lives of innocent attackers in order to do 
so. How, then, is this sense of entitlement compatible with 
the argument from rational excuse I have offered? 
To say that a defendant should be exonerated on the 
basis of a "rational excuse" is not necessarily to say that he 
has done something society regards as wrong or 
reprehensible, although some instances of rational excuse 
fall in this category. It may be that from a moral 
standpoint we are uncertain or ambivalent about the moral 
merits of the defendant's conduct. It is true that the 
category of rational excuse does not apply to conduct that 
the law wishes to exonerate because it is particularly 
commendable. Acts of this sort, such as true lesser evils 
cases, belong to the category of justification proper. But 
the fact that the conduct is forbidden by law and that it is 
not particularly commendable does not mean that it is 
reprehensible either. Thus the category of "rational 
excuse" is not restricted to morally opprobrious conduct. It 
should also be stressed, however, that there is a common 
misconception that may be driving the view of excuse as 
applying to morally reprehensible action, and this is the 
idea that action we have a moral right to perform is 
commendable. Thus in support of seeing self-defense as a 
justification, it is sometimes said that surely people have a 
right to defend themselves, even against innocent 
attackers, and then to add that it is a good thing when 
people stand on such a right. While people may have a 
moral right to defend their lives, it hardly follows that it is 
always a good thing that they exercise this right. Some 
rights are morally indifferent, and some can be positively 
loathsome when exercised. Thus the fact that the legal 
right of self�defense may be supported by a moral right of 
self-defense does not seem to me to count in favor of 
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treating the legal right as a justification.  And, on the other 
hand, to treat conduct in self-defense as excused does not 
tend to suggest that it is bad or morally reprehensible. 
I have argued that the defenses I have called "rational 
excuses" are best understood as instances where the law 
exonerates because the defendant's choice to violate the law 
reflects a disposition the law wishes to endorse. Strong 
prudential or other-regarding motivations sometimes lead 
an agent to violate the primary norms of conduct, and 
where this is the case, we do not hold the agent to the same 
standards we would absent such motivation. We must now 
consider the justification for constructing our rules of legal 
defense according to the dictates of rational self-interest, 
and so instituting rational excuses as exceptions to basic 
legal norms. That is, if the primary legal norms establish a 
standard of conduct below which we do not want 
individuals to fall, then why should we exempt individuals 
from those rules to make room for adaptive dispositions, 
absent a justification for the exempt conduct? I shall 
address this and other issues in the concluding section 
below. 
VI. CONCLUSION: A CONTRACTARIAN JUSTIFICATION FOR 
THE RATIONAL EXCUSES 
If the possession of the foregoing dispositions is of 
benefit to each individual, we have a basis for thinking of 
the exoneration in cases in which a rational excuse applies 
as justifiable: Given that it is not possible to ensure that 
people act cooperatively in the absence of strong 
cooperative dispositions, there are reasons of mutual 
advantage for excusing an agent who acts on the basis of an 
adaptive disposition in cases in which doing so leads her to 
violate the law. Rational agents may not have reason 
collectively to prefer the particular illegal action that issues 
from an adaptive disposition in a given case, but they have 
reason to prefer that others possess such dispositions. 
Rational agents inventing rules governing the operation of 
the excuses would choose to exonerate others who act on 
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such dispositions, since such rules would leave each person 
individually better off than he would be in the absence of 
such rules. And if this is the case, then rules of this sort 
would be readily agreed to by members of society selecting 
the legal rules by which they wish to be governed. The 
rules governing rational excuses are thus fair and 
justifiable, because they represent the choices rational 
agents attempting to enhance their own well-being would 
make for themselves in an ex ante position of agreement. 
Consider once again the example of duress. As I 
suggested above, it may well be better for society as a 
whole if legal rules insisted that innocent individuals not 
participate in the criminal activities of those by whom they 
are coerced. This is probably even true where requiring an 
innocent agent to resist the demand to participate in 
criminal activity would have serious personal 
consequences. One reason to prefer sticking to the primary 
legal rule over the personal exemption is obvious: potential 
coercers would have less chance of successfully coercing 
others if the potential victims knew there would be no 
criminal defense for their behavior. Thus adherence to the 
legal rule may appear to be optimal here. Yet I have 
argued that rational individuals would agree to exempt 
victims of coercion from their responsibility for the criminal 
act in this sort of case. Why? I have argued that the non­
legal benefits of adaptive dispositions give agents reason to 
prefer a society in which such dispositions are given wide 
deference to one in which they are severely restricted. 
Thus even if there are good reasons for sticking with the 
primary legal nonnsf rational agents may .regard 
themselves as better off under a regime that carves out 
various exceptions to those norms. This may even be true 
if sticking to the norms would actually be better, from the 
standpoint of social utility, to allowing the exceptions, even 
taking the benefits of the dispositions into account. For the 
fact that a rule would maximize social welfare does not 
mean that each individual who must live under that rule 
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has reason to think his own welfare maximized by 
accepting its terms. 50 
There is, however, a fmal wrinkle we should briefly 
explore. Earlier we made the argument that dispositions 
are preferable to legal enforcement, because there is a cost­
savings from avoiding the costs of pre-commitment. But 
arguably dispositions involve costs of their own. And if so, 
then the argument we saw about the superiority of 
dispositions over pre-commitment devices seems to apply to 
non-dispositional over dispositional decisionmaking: While 
a disposition allows agents to reap the benefits of 
cooperation with other agents, it would be better if human 
beings simply committed themselves to behaving 
cooperatively. So if dispositions are preferable to pre­
commitment devices because they accomplish the same 
ends without the costs, then surely rational, case-by-case 
commitment is preferable to dispositional commitment, for 
the same reason. If so, then the contractarian argument 
we have just considered for indulging dispositions is subject 
to doubt. 
It is admittedly true that dispositions involve costs. 
There are costs involved in acquiring the disposition in the 
first place. And there are costs of the sort associated with 
any practical rule, stemming from the fact that rules are 
imperfectly tailored to the situations to which they apply. 
Thus the generous person might continue to give even after 
his recipient has shown himself to be an undeserving 
wretch; the miser might continue to pinch pennies even 
after the need to do so has been eliminated by his winning 
the lottery. And the person who is deeply loyal to family 
50. This last point is an exceptionally complicated one, and I have mostly side­
stepped it in the above argument. That is, I have assumed for the most part that 
making room for adaptive dispositions as exceptions to primary legal norms 
would maximize society's overall welfare, as well as maximize the welfare of 
individual agents. But at least theoretically, it is possible that each agent in a 
position of antecedent social choice would regard himself as better oft' under a 
legal regime that was non-optimal from the standpoint of social welfare. And in 
that case, the contractarian justification for legal rules I am suggesting here 
would diverge from the utilitarian or welfarist analysis that would support 
sticking with the legal rule. 
358 BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:317 
and friends may commit a crime as a result of such loyalty, 
under circumstances in which it would be better if he did 
not. Like any practical rule, adaptive dispositions will 
sometimes be both over and under-inclusive. 51 
Thus a society of perfectly rational agents seeking the 
benefits of cooperation and coordination would not make 
use of adaptive dispositions. Individuals in such a society 
would simply cooperate where there were mutual gains 
from doing so, and otherwise they would proceed by 
enforceable legal prohibitions where those were beneficial 
instead. That is, perfectly rational agents would ask 
themselves whether they would be better off under a given 
cooperative arrangement than they would be outside that 
arrangement. Where the agreement provides a net benefit, 
perfectly rational agents would be faithful to their 
agreements: they would use internal commitment to 
reproduce the effects that less than perfectly rational 
agents would achieve through the formation of dispositions. 
And where this was the case, the contractarian argument 
for the incorporation of the rational excuses into legal rules 
would not go through. For agents would not form 
dispositions under these circumstances, and legal rules 
would not have to be shaped to accommodate them. But 
the human actors for whom the rules of the criminal law 
are fashioned are not perfectly rational. They are not 
agents who would otherwise be capable of instituting 
cooperative ventures in the absence of enforcement or some 
reputational or other incentive to cooperate. Cooperative 
dispositions, on the other hand, make it possible for agents 
to coope.rate in the absence of such external incentives. 
Thus the contractarian argument justifying the existence of 
the rational excuses we have just considered is compelling 
as long as we understand its applicability as limited to 
legal societies established by somewhat imperfectly 
rational agents. 
51. See Frederick Shauer, Playing By the Rules: A Philosophical Examination 
of Rule-based Decision-making in Law and Life (1991) 
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The significance of the account of the adaptive 
dispositions I am proposing should now be clear: 
Dispositions are strategies agents can adopt in order to 
compensate for the fact that they are less than perfectly 
rational. They allow imperfectly rational agents to 
approximate the position they would be in if they were 
perfectly rational. The law of criminal defenses takes that 
imperfection into account, allowing basically rational 
agents to compensate for their own irrationality by forming 
dispositions. Such dispositions are "adaptive," because 
they allow human beings to act in ways that ultimately 
increase their own well-being and those of their fellows. 
The criminal law accommodates and encourages the 
formation of such dispositions by exonerating or partially 
excusing agents who act on the basis of them. 
